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Fanning the Flames of NIMBY:
A Book Review of
THE PROMISE AND PERIL OF ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE1

Gary A. Abraham

2

For some years local opponents of landfills, waste incinerators,
and other potentially toxic facilities have drawn the ire of planners
and site developers by pointing out that landfills leak,3 incinerators
produce new toxic chemicals not found in the garbage they bum,4 and
the toxic effects of chronic exposure to common chemicals is
unknown. 5 They therefore say no to such sites, and they don't trust
cleanup plans for already polluted sites even when proponents and
public agencies say these sites pose no meaningful health risks.
Academics and activists have responded to this social movement by
urging that "environmental justice" (EJ) be part of national siting
policy and site-specific environmental impact review procedures, in

I
Christopher H. Foreman, Jr., THE PROMISE AND PERIL OF
ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE (Brookings Institution Press 1998).
2
J.D. 1998 University at Buffalo School of Law; Ph.D. 1988 University
of Pittsburgh (Sociology). Mr. Abraham is President of Concemed Citizens of
Cattaraugus County (NY).
3
See Eric Lipton, As ImportedGarbagePiles Up, So Do Worries, THE
WASHINGTON POST, Nov. 12, 1998, A15 (reporting that of seven modem
landfills in Virginia accepting garbage from the Bronx and Brooklyn, New
York, groundwater polluted with heavy metals is linked to two).
4
See Lois Marie Gibbs, DYING FROM DIOXIN: A CITIZENS GUIDE TO
RECLAIMING OUR HEALTH AND REBUILDING DEMOCRACY (South End Press
1995), 53-54, 210-14. The first half of this book is edited summaries and
discussions of US-EPA, HEALTH ASSESSMENT DOCUMENT FOR 2,3,7,8TETRACHLORODIBENZO-P-DIOXIN (TCDD) AND RELATED COMPOUNDS,
EPA/600/BP-2/00a, b, c (June 1994), and US-EPA, ESTIMATING EXPOSURE TO
DIOXIN-LIKE COMPOUNDS, EPA/600/6-88005Ca, b, c (June 1994), prepared by
contributing scientists under the direction of toxicologist Stephen Lester.
s
See John D. Graham, Risk-Based EnvironmentalAdvocacy, 6 RISK IN
PERSPECTIVE No. 7 (August 1998) (noting that "many widely used chemicals
are not minimally tested for toxicity"). Graham is Director and Professor of
Policy and Decision Science for the Center for Risk Analysis, Harvard School
of Public Health, which publishes RISK INPERSPECTIVE.
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recognition ofthe cumulative impact that concentrations of such sites
may pose to disadvantaged communities. EJ has, in turn, become a
rallying cry of many local siting opponents.
Brookings Institution senior fellow Christopher Foreman, Jr.,
believes EJ grows out of "antiscientific, even antirational thinking
common in academia" and certain "social aspirations and popular
emotions that underlie a democratizing focus" but not authentic
public health concerns. Attempts to include EJ considerations in
federal environmental policy are neither environmental- or healthbased but rather a back door way to reassert "the Great Society's
thrust for 'maximum feasible participation' by the poor in the
community action programs of the 1960s." Allying himself with
Supreme Court Justice Stephen Breyer's position in Breaking the
Vicious Circle: Toward Effective Risk Regulation,6 Foreman asserts
that the issues raised by EJ advocates can be resolved by applying a
"rationalizing" approach to the environmental health concerns that
ought to be addressed by government agencies. Foreman specifically
proposes to replace equity demands with quantitative risk assessment
procedures (RA). Such demands, Foreman believes, have up to now
been asserted in such a vague and expansive manner as to be
unworkable and counterproductive in any effort to improve the health
of disadvantaged groups. Regulatory policymakers could improve
environmental health if they were free to coordinate available
expertise in the assessment of known risks, and freed from the burden
of dealing with "popular intuition" about risk and generalized fears
about toxics and racism.
Foreman acknowledges that "risk assessment" is the language
of regulators and the regulated community, who are "often more
powerful" than local stakeholders. While noting the importance of
"suspicions of experts who often downplay hazards that residents
deem significant," Foreman insists that local opposition is informed
by "environmental justice discourse," and both are ultimately
irresponsible: "both environmental justice and the broader

Harvard University Press 1993.
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phenomenon of environmental populism, sometimes referred to as
'ecopopulism,' are ultimately less concerned with health risks than
with advocacy itself-- the elevation of a distinctive community voice
whenever and wherever possible in the environmental policy
process." Local communitarians and their intellectual leaders betray
not only the health interests of their communities, but their economic
interests as well. This is because the industrial facilities they oppose
could bring jobs and economic revitalization to their communities
and, with the lifting of standards of living, improvement of public
health.
Foreman's proposal is unlikely to gain many adherents beyond
those already committed to RA. Nor is it likely to reduce the growth
of local siting controversies, a central concern for Foreman. This is
partly because Foreman's portrait ofwhat he calls "the EJ movement"
is inaccurate. The phenomenon of local equity demands was first
noticed over two decades ago in industry and planning literature,
which introduced the "NIMBY" label ("not in my backyard"),
describing local opponents of siting proposals as primarily selfish and
short-sighted, unconcerned about the regional and national economic
agenda of planners and polluters. The NIMBY theory was designed
to discredit the layman's perspective on siting decisions not for its
self-interested aspects, which are not distinctive, but rather because
it is at odds with increasingly standardized reliance on technical
expertise to meet regulatory standards for safety and risk. Foreman's
proposal builds on the NIMBY model, so when we hear from local
opponents to new toxic sites and to cleanup plans for old sites
proposed by regulators and polluters, it is only their most shrill
statements, coming at the end of a process from which they feel
excluded. No consideration of an actual siting dispute is included in
his book. He also avoids any discussion of when and how risk
assessments should be performed and reviewed, giving the
impression that there is not a great debate in law and policy on the
role of the RA approach. Together these two important lacunae in his
presentation severely undermine Foreman's claim to have found a
"rationalizing" alternative to environmental justice.
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The Nature of Siting Disputes
Siting disputes are by their nature local. The approach siting
proponents, polluters, and regulators take to such disputes is to weigh
known local burdens against regional and national benefits. This
approach almost always results in setting a minimal level ofpermitted
chemical release, since at some point known risks cease to outweigh
the costs of preventing chemical releases at the customary level or
banning some chemical production or use altogether.
Local stakeholders and the public generally are much more
likely to adopt a prudential approach. Prudence may be called for
where a high concentration of potentially polluting sites exists or
where many of the effects of toxics likely to be released into the
environment are unknown. Because it balances the cost of changing
current industrial practices against known public health costs the RA
approach, unlike the prudence approach, is unlikely to justify any
change when health effects are unknown. By contrast, the prudence
approach under some circumstances will justify a chemical release
level of zero, a result rarely if ever reached by RA.
The perspective oflocal opponents ofpotentially toxic facilities
is not as restricted as Foreman suggests. Local opponents compare
their communities with others not burdened by the risks of accidental
and unavoidable discharge oftoxics or other specific adverse impacts
on the environment, and to this extent local opponents adopt a
regional and national perspective. Indeed, comparison is at the heart
of local judgments that a facility is unwanted, and such comparison
prompts the typical questions opponents insist on injecting into siting
decisions. Why is a landfill being sited here, far from the source of
the waste? Why are there no chemical factories in wealthier suburban
communities? Why are such facilities concentrated in working-class
communities? Why should we take such a disproportionate burden for
hosting such facilities? Are such facilities really necessary? If
potentially toxic facilities were sited in wealthier communities, would
the likely opposition to such siting decisions increase the costs of
production and make producers rethink the way they produce? Such
questions are ultimately about the fair distribution of costs and
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benefits of development, and local concerned citizens become quite
conscious of this aspect of their opposition with little or no help from
EJ advocates. However, such questions are not considered in the
review process, not because they are irrational but often because they
are excluded by the logic and practice of RA.
Foreman is silent about an important aspect of EJ, the inequity
in resources required to participate in an environmental site review.
The RA approach promotes this sort of inequity. Despite the fact that
environmental impact review mandates public participation in most
siting decisions, regulators and the regulated community bring a team
of attorneys, engineers and science experts to the review proceedings.
Without such resources the right to public participation of local
citizen stakeholders, as well as most small municipal stakeholders, is
little more than a procedural formality, since they have no real access
to the data, language and methods of review. The restriction ofpublic
participation to a procedural right would be fair if resources for
meaningful participation were not so unequal and if environmental
review was not restricted to one kind of quantitative method of risk
determination. But administrative law judges deciding permit
applications and, to an increasing extent, civil and criminal judges
adjudicating challenges to cleanup plans, permit approvals, and
claims of toxic torts, have accepted the priority given to RA
procedures by regulators and the regulated community as a means to
facilitate judicial management of disputes.
Their inability to effectively participate leads citizen groups and
local officials to insist on a more accessible reasonability standard
which they urge be applied to what is not known rather than what is
known about risks. Prudence is almost always introduced at this
point. However, regulators and judges will instruct small local
stakeholders that they bear the burden of showing an unacceptable
level of risk, which in the face of the unknown they cannot do. This
only elicits opposition to the process.
"Mitigations" are often introduced by the applicant or
responsible party to compensate local communities for adverse
environmental impacts rather than to reduce the likelihood of those
impacts. For example, instead of perpetual care for a commercial
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landfill site, adding protections to the local groundwater supply, the
applicant will offer to build a park for the local municipality. Instead
of reducing the size of an industrial facility or incorporating
alternative production processes, the applicant will commit to hiring
a certain number of local employees or grant a certain number of local
contracts. The contribution the applicant's proposal makes to local
and extra-local economic goals is often explicitly cited by the
decision-maker among the reasons for approving the proposal. Seeing
that environmental protection is less important than balancing local
burdens against regional and national economic goals in which local
people have little role to play makes local stakeholders cynical about
environmental permitting agencies and leads them to experience the
decision-making process as fundamentally unfair.
Foreman never attempts to provide an objective description of
the spiral of local opposition he criticizes. Instead, he severely
narrows the scope of EJ issues. This makes for a highly abstract
argument, often quite detached from the real world of environmental
decision-making.
For example, Foreman argues that because individual behavior
accounts for a large part ofblacks' disproportionate health problems,
the black community would be better served from a health
perspective by addressing obesity and smoking. Extending the
theories of Shelby Steele and other black conservatives, Foreman
suggests that by ignoring such health problems black NIMBYs have
become victims of their own race victimology. These comments are
way off the mark if Foreman wants to understand the NIMBY
syndrome. The distinctive health problems of minority groups has
little to do with opposition to toxic facility siting, which cuts across
all groups. If a given community's average individual behavior is
distinctive, and if those distinctive features increase the community's
health risks, less regard for the likelihood that new facility siting will
add to their toxic exposure than in other communities is not
particularly rational.
Foreman also seeks to strengthen his case against the EJ
movement by distinguishing environmental health impacts from other
adverse impacts like noise, smell, truck traffic, and from primarily
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aesthetic objections to a concentration of industrial sites. Non-health
concerns in this narrow sense are downplayed as "environmental
amenities," which Foreman suggests have no place in environmental
impact review.7 Concern with such environmental amenities is
consistent with research showing that the public evaluates risk in
terms of "an array of quality of life concerns, including 'peace of
mind, sense of community, and fairness to future generations,"'
suggesting to Foreman that environmental health risks are being
ignored. If this is true, and legitimate health concerns do not underlie
peace of mind and fairness to future generations, restricting the
public's role in environmental impact review to receiving information
from decision-makers should cool out the NIMBY syndrome. The
loss of "democracy and issue permeability" in local siting decisions
would, Foreman believes, be offset by "stronger guidance and
assistance, especially for ever-critical educational and risk
communication tasks."
Finally, quite apart from the questions whether siting inequities
are appropriate, or whether the impact of inequitable concentrations
of environmentally risky sites should be included in the review of
impacts of a proposed new site, Foreman never really considers
whether inequitable regional and community concentrations of
hazardous facilities exist. His lengthy discussion offederal EJ efforts,
especially the Clinton Administration's EJ initiatives at which
Foreman directs some of his strongest criticism, relies on the lack of
evidence for a specifically racial distributional bias to discredit all
environmental equity arguments. As a result, he devotes much
attention to the politics of federal EJ policy but never seriously
considers the policy on its own terms.

Foreman would therefore roll back some state environmental statutes.
E.g., New York Environmental Quality Review Act, N.Y. ENVTL. CONSERV.
LAW § 8-0105(6) (McKinney's 1997) (the environment includes "the physical
conditions which will be affected by a proposed action, including land, air,
water, minerals, flora, fauna, noise, objects of historic or aesthetic significance,
existing patterns of population concentration, distribution or growth, and
existing community or neighborhood character).
7
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A considerable amount of research has been generated by
claims of "environmental racism" in the siting of toxic facilities, but
the results have been inconclusive. The most we can say is that such
facilities are disproportionately sited in lower-income, specifically
blue-collar communities, either in industrial neighborhoods or in
rural, sparsely populated communities! In western New York, for
example, because working-class and rural low-income communities
are predominantly white, locational bias by environmental decision
makers having a disparate impact on such communities would not be
captured by the concept of environmental racism. However,
commercial and inactive hazardous waste sites and commercial
landfills, which are highly concentrated in the region, are consistently
sited in such communities.' "Environmental justice," because of its
broader reach, encompasses disparate impacts on these communities
as well as on racial minority communities in other regions of the
country. EJ is thus the better policy concept for addressing
distributional inequities.
In 1994 President Clinton issued Executive Order 12,898,
"Federal Actions to Address Environmental Justice in Minority
Populations and Low-Income Populations," directing "each federal
agency [to] make achieving environmental justice part of its mission
by identifying and addressing, as appropriate, disproportionately high
and adverse human health or environmental effects of its programs,
policies, and activities on minority populations and low-income

Cf. Vicki Been, Coming to the Nuisance or Going to the Barrios? A
Longitudinal Analysis of Environmental Justice Claims, 24 ECOLOGY L.Q. 1
(1997) (reporting results of a US-EPA funded study of demographics of the 544
communities nationwide hosting active commercial hazardous waste treatment
storage and disposal facilities in 1994 and discussing literature).
9
See R. Nils Olsen, Jr., The Concentrationof CommercialHazardous
Waste Facilitiesin the Western New York Community, 39 BUFFALO L. REV. 473
(1991); Daniel A. Spitzer, Maybe in My Backyard: Strategiesfor Local

Regulation of PrivateSolid Waste Facilitiesin New York, I BUFF. ENVT'L. L.J.
87 (1993).
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populations.""' By expanding the reach of disparate impact analysis,
for the first time, from race to class, the EJ Executive Order avoids
the criticisms that can be leveled at claims of "environmental racism."
The Order does not create a presumption against distributional
inequity. Nor does it provide new substantive rights. Rather, its aim
is to expand the public participation approach of existing
environmental law. Accordingly, the Order largely leaves untouched
the discretion enjoyed by agency decision makers who comply with
current law's procedural mandate to provide an opportunity for public
participation in the review process. This reflects the Clinton
Administration's approach to EJ issues, to broaden and strengthen
public right-to-know provisions in current law and rely on concerned
citizens and groups to put pressure on decision makers to solve
purported inequities in siting and clean-up decisions at the local level.
This is also consistent with the vast bulk of environmental protection
law, which affords the public procedural rights to participation but
leaves most environmental decision-making to local authorities and
government agencies.
The promise of the federal EJ approach lies in expanding
opportunities for the public to show a risk of disparate impacts on a
case-by-case basis. Ultimately it is a factual question whether any
given community (1) suffers adverse environmental impacts and (2)
suffers disparate impacts. Claims brought before the EPA's
Environmental Appeals Board challenging permit decisions under the
EJ Executive Order have resulted in holdings requiring true
environmental mitigation, up to a denial of the permit, where a

Exec. Order No. 12,989, 59 Fed. Reg. 7629, § 1-10 1.The Order directs
each agency to "ensure greater public participation... among minority
populations and low-income populations" and to specifically implement the
Order's mission in the areas of enforcement, public participation, and research.
59 Fed. Reg. 7629, 7630, § 1-103. See also US-EPA, EnvironmentalJustice
Strategy: Executive Order 12898, EPA/200-R-95-002, at 8 (April 1995) (calling
for "early and ongoing public participation in permitting and siting decisions").
30
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showing of these two elements is made." The problem of adequate
resources discussed above remains unaddressed by these holdings,
and further problems are presented by how the area subject to
disparate impact analysis is determined in the first place. However,
contrary to Foreman's proposal, these holdings in theory embrace all
reasonable approaches for determining the risk of adverse impacts,
not only the RA approach.
It is hard to understand why Foreman would object to
expanding the scope of a determination of actual adverse
environmental impacts, which is all the Order does. It is easier to
understand Foreman's criticism of the EJ Executive Order as
objections to public participation in risk determination and to a more
open consideration of the qualitative basis of RA in practice. These
two objections are closely related.
Hiding Values With Risk Assessment
The ability to avoid consideration of value judgments, or
qualitative decisions, by using a quantitative method and language of
analysis is an important part of the attractiveness of RA. Masking the
application of value judgments under RA also serves to restrict the
11

See Gary A. Abraham, Review ofActions Under PresidentClinton's
Executive Orderon EnvironmentalJustice,5 BUFF. ENVT'L. L.J. 79 (1997)

(discussing cases). The same standard has been applied in a Title VI complaint.
US-EPA, Office of Civil Rights (OCR), Investigative'Reportfor Title VI
Administrative ComplaintFileNo. 5R-98-R5 (Select Steel Complaint), October
30, 1998 <http://www.epa.gov:80/reg5oopa/pdf/selsteel.pdf>, p. 26 (air quality
impacts). It should be noted, however, that the Select Steel complaint was
dismissed on grounds illustrating many of the points made above in the text. For
example, with regard to complainants' concern that dioxin emissions should be
monitored to guard against a disparate impact, acknowledging that EPA's data
was provided by the applicant, (id., p. 6), who asserted that "dioxins are not
emitted by steel recycling mini-mills," (id., p. 35), OCR arrived at "afinding of
no disparate impact associated with [the state environmental agency's] decision
not to include monitoring requirements for dioxin in the permit" because "EPA
has no emissions data for American mini-mills," nor "regulations or other
guidance to direct the review of this issue." Id., pp. 35-36 (emphasis added).
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role of public participation in environmental impact review. In a
review process dominated by the RA approach it is illegitimate to call
attention to the qualitative judgments made by agencies and siting
proponents. By rendering qualitative comments coming from the
public out-of-bounds, the RA approach becomes one of the most
important causes of the NIMBY syndrome.
RA results always reflect prior qualitative judgments about the
data subject to analysis. Foreman's neglect of this all too common
aspect of RA asks us to believe that siting proponents, who generally
provide all the data on which agency decision-making is based, do not
have a material interest in the most favorable modeling assumptions
and sampling procedures, or that there are no bad actors. Such
assumptions and procedures are not reflected in the quantitative
presentation of the analysis and often escape critical review. For
example, a proposal to clean up a schoolyard contaminated with
arsenic was recently supported by RA methods applied to six-inch
soil samples taken from the schoolyard. The sampling showed
average arsenic levels slightly below background levels (levels that
were elevated as a result of historical use of arsenic-bearing pesticide
in surrounding orchards). However, three-inch depth samples would
have resulted in much more alarming evidence of health risks, six
times higher, because arsenic concentrations were highest in the
surface soils, but the responsible party's choice of deeper samples
diluted the significance of those concentrations. In this case federal
and state environment and health agencies, who were parties to the
remedial plan, were initially silent about that choice. Had a pro-bono
independent expert reviewer not commented on the issue the
qualitative value behind the use of RA methods would have gone
unnoticed.
On other occasions the application of the RA approach does not
reduce the production ofpollution but rather encourages toxic facility
siting in relatively pristine places. For example, in a rural town where
all residents are dependent on well-water and where no chemical
contamination of groundwater has been detected, residents asked a
commercial landfill developer at a public meeting why he wanted to
site the landfill there rather than in a community where alternative
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sources of drinking water were available. The developer replied that
the town was a better site because it would take much longer for local
groundwater to reach state minimum contaminant levels than in other
communities. Local residents' strong desire to avoid added risks
posed by the site could be legitimately disregarded by regulators and
the developer, since it was a relatively easy task to show that
minimum levels of permitted chemical release could be met with RA
methods.
However, the lack of attention paid to qualitative elements of
judgment and the priority given to quantitative elements by agencies
and judges may also be inherent in a review process dominated by RA
methods. Neglect of qualitative judgment arises from the meaning of
"scientific" authority on which the RA approach relies. The
comparative or distributional impact ofburdens and benefits is clearly
subject to quantitative assessment, but in siting disputes because this
theme is considered to be a matter of qualitative judgment, "value
judgments," little or no authority exists for raising that theme.
Statistical or probabilistic methods of risk assessment also involve a
combination of quantitative and qualitative calculation. Value
judgments are applied, in the RA context, both to the way benefits are
selected (e.g., a national, regional, or state-wide average of
conventional economic measures) and to the burden of risk subject to
calculation (only what is known). However, the more open the
recognition that distinctions of value are the basis for specific
measures of risk, the less authority will attach to the method of
assessment. 2 In order to preserve its authority in environmental
decision-making the qualitative basis of RA judgments is therefore
rarely acknowledged. The abstract and practical blindness to
qualitative judgment that has become part of the review process
usually results in the spiral of local opposition described above.
James S. Freeman and Rachel D. Godsil, The Question of Risk:
IncorporatingCommunity Perceptionsinto EnvironmentalRisk Assessments, 21
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 547, 566 (1994). See also John S. Applegate, Beyond the
UsualSuspects: The Use of Citizens Advisory Boards in Environmental
Decisionmaking,73 Indiana L.J. 903 (1998).
12
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Conclusion

The ability of siting proponents to use the RA approach to
avoid engaging the public's insistence on a prudential approach to
risk determination has created a practical and policy context in which
environmental justice impact review makes sense. It is one way to
force action on equity claims, even if this is only the devotion of
additional resources to expanded review or specific mitigations
directed to specific disparate impacts. It should also stimulate
consideration of value questions in the broader debate about
environmental policy. Such consideration must include meaningful
discussion of how resources necessary to undertake data gathering
and risk determination can be provided outside the regulators and the
regulated community, who control the review process, to more
equitably distribute the opportunity to participate. An effective right
to public participation would enhance the debate over methods ofrisk
determination.
Shorn of its largely rhetorical excesses, Foreman has a valid
point to make, and to which EJ advocates and NIMBY opposition
groups, shorn of their own rhetorical excesses, could make a
meaningful contribution. Foreman is right to criticize a siting policy
that would embrace a substantive right to distributional equity
without regard to actual risks. In specific cases, he insists, the
environmental impacts of a potentially toxic facility are likely to be
negligible. This contingent, case-specific criticism of EJ as a general
approach is unfortunately lost in the polarizing argument to which
most of his book is devoted.
Local concerned citizens groups and, to an increasing extent,
local municipalities, are calling for technical assistance grants so they
can undertake independent review of the hydrogeological, air toxics
and other physical science bases supporting siting decisions. But the
"guidance and assistance" Foreman calls for seems instead designed
to win local stakeholders over to risk assessment methodology
reviewed exclusively by agency staff. This is precisely what local
stakeholders are reacting to by demanding technical assistance. As a
policy proposal, Foreman's advice will surely inflame passions rather

128

BUFFALO ENVIRONMENTAL LAW JOURNAL

[Vol 6

than resolve the NIMBY problem.
However, Foreman's proposal fails on its own terms as well.
The priority Foreman gives to known and immediate health-based RA
is justified only where there is adequate information on health
impacts of potentially toxic substances, and only where adverse
environmental impacts difficult to tie directly to physical health are
clearly unimportant. There are very few contexts where both of these
conditions are met. In most cases our ignorance about the health
effects of chemical pollution prevails (as does our ignorance about the
likelihood that specific techniques for containing pollution will be
effective), and health impacts are only one of a range of legitimate
concerns those asked to host an unwanted facility bring to the table.
Under such circumstances prudence is a legitimate and rational
approach to risk determination, and insistence on RA merely because
it results in a quantifiable measure of impacts and thereby facilitates
the decision-making process is not more rational.

